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I
Background and Summary
The royalties paid to copyright owners for the use of their
works typically are established in the marketplace. The producers of information and entertainment maintain exclusive control of their product and attempt to negotiate the best possible
price for it in the competitive marketplace. In the particular
case of cable's retransmission of copyrighted television programs, Congress departed from this tradition. The Copyright
Revision Act of 1976 (Act) affords cable systems a compulsory
license to retransmit whatever television programming is
permitted under the rules of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC); that is, cable operators may carry such
programming without having to negotiate with copyright owners.' The Act also prescribes the royalty payments that cable
operators must make for the use of this programming.2
The statutory fee schedule is essentially immutable insofar
as it concerns the payment for programming carried pursuant
to the FCC rules in effect on April 15, 1976.1 However, the
1. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2) (1982). Although the compulsory license extends to all
television programming that the FCC permits cable systems to carry, the Act imposes
royalties only for the carriage of the nonnetwork programming on television stations
which are carried beyond their local service areas. The royalties are collected by the
Copyright Office and then distributed to the copyright owners of the retransmitted
television programming by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. See generally National
Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982); National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
3. The only exception is that the Copyright Royalty Tribunal may make certain
limited adjustments to account for inflation. See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (2) (A) (1982); Na*-
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Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal), an independent
agency within the legislative branch,4 is empowered to adjust
the rates for programming carried as a result of changes in certain of these rules.5
In 1980 the FCC voted to repeal two sets of cable rules. The
first had restricted the number of television signals which certain cable systems could import from distant markets (distant
signals); the other had required the blacking out of certain syndicated programming on distant signals.' After conducting an
extensive evidentiary proceeding, the Tribunal in the fall of
1982 increased the statutory rates by as much as 1500 percent
for programming which cable systems carry as a result of FCC
deregulation.7
The Tribunal concluded: "We do not find in the compulsory
license, as it exists today, any public policy justification for establishing royalty rates below reasonable marketplace expectations of the copyright owners."8 Accordingly, the Tribunal
set rates which, on the basis of the record before it, reflect the
marketplace value of distant signal television programming. In
making this determination, the Tribunal focused upon evidence of the prices actually charged for programming in marketplaces analogous to the hypothetical distant signal
marketplace. This evidence, in the Tribunal's judgment, made
it clear that the statutory rates "could not be considered those
that would result from full marketplace conditions if the comtional Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (1982). For a more comprehensive description of the Tribunal and its various responsibilities under the Act, see Korman & Koenigsberg, The First
Proceeding Before the Copyright Royalty Tribunal: ASCAP and the Public Broadcasters, 1 COMM. & THE LAw 15 (1979).
5. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(b) (2) (B) and (C) (1982).
6. See Malrite TV of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
7. The Tribunal's decision is published at 47 Fed. Reg. 52,146 (1982).
The Tribunal determined that a cable system must pay 3.75 percent of its gross receipts from basic services for each "distant signal equivalent" that it was not permitted
to carry under the former FCC rules. (See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (f) (1982) for the definition of

"distant signal equivalent.") The Tribunal also imposed a surcharge of between 0.089
and 0.599 percent on each distant signal equivalent that had been subject to the FCC's
former syndicated exclusivity rules. By way of comparison, the statutory rates range
from 0.2 percent to 0.675 percent for each distant signal equivalent.
The new rates do not apply to any cable system which has less than $214,000 in semiannual gross receipts from basic services. There are also a number of other factors
which might exempt any particular system from having to pay the new rates.
8. 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,153.
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pulsory license did not exist."9
The Tribunal's decision is one of the most significant and
controversial ever affecting the Congressionally mandated
marriage of copyright owners and cable operators. Its significance extends well beyond the fact that it will require the
cable industry to pay an estimated $20 million in additional
royalties each year. 10 Copyright owners have hailed the decision as recognizing that: (1) they should receive marketplace
compensation from the cable industry and should not be
forced to subsidize cable by providing their copyrighted programming at below-market rates; and (2) the statutory rates
fall well short of adequate marketplace compensation. The
cable industry, on the other hand, has attacked the new rates
as excessive, claiming that most cable operators will drop distant signals rather than pay the increased royalties; therefore,
they argue, the effect of the Tribunal's decision will be to reimpose the very restrictions which the FCC had eliminated."
The National Cable Television Association (NCTA) has appealed the Tribunal's rate increases to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 2 It also has
mounted a lobbying campaign to secure Congressional reversal of the Tribunal's decision. Cable's efforts failed in the 97th
Congress, although it did secure a short postponement of the
effective date of the rates for distant signals added as a result
of FCC deregulation. 3 The cable forces have returned to the
9. Id. at 52,154.
10. Brown, Copyright Royalties Spur TV 'Air Wars,' The Washington Post, March
6, 1983, at K13.
11. The number of trade journal and newspaper articles that have been written
concerning the Tribunal's decision is legion. For one relatively comprehensive account of industry reaction, see Cable Operators Scramble in Distant Signal Crisis,
CABLEAGE, Jan. 31, 1983.

12. National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, No. 82-2389
(D.C. Cir., Ifiled November 19, 1982). The parties involved in this appeal include several
individual cable system operators; the States of New York and Connecticut; the Motion Picture Association of America; the National Association of Broadcasters; individual broadcasters; the music performing rights societies; various "common carriers"
which retransmit distant signals to cable operators; the National Basketball Association; the National Hockey League; the North American Soccer League; the National
Collegiate Athletic Association; and Major League Baseball.
13. The effective date of the 3.75 percent rate was extended from January 1, 1983 to
March 15, 1983. No change was made in the effective date of the Tribunal's syndicated
exclusivity rate adjustment. See generally Fitzpatrick & Sherman, 97th Congress Reconciles Few Copyright Debates, Legal Times, Feb. 7, 1983, at 21.
Earlier during the 97th Congress, the NCTA, the Motion Picture Association of
America, and the National Association of Broadcasters had negotiated a compromise
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98th Congress in the hopes of obtaining legislation which will
nullify or severely restrict the Tribunal's actions.1
The cable industry has raised several questions concerning
the Tribunal's increase in rates for additional distant signals.
The central issues, however, are (1) whether the Tribunal has
exceeded its statutory authority by establishing rates which
seek to replicate a free marketplace and which are well above
those originally set forth in the Copyright Revision Act; and
(2) whether, as a matter of policy, the Tribunal should have
established such rates. The purpose of this article is to provide
a framework within which the foregoing issues can be evaluated. The article does so by focusing upon the genesis of the
statutory rate schedule and the Tribunal's rate adjustment authority, and upon the technological, market, regulatory and
other changes that have occurred since passage of the Act.
The conclusions to be drawn are that the Tribunal acted within
the broad discretion granted to it by Congress, and that the Tribunal's adoption of a marketplace standard is fully justified as
a matter of policy. Indeed, Congress itself should reexamine
the rates applicable to all programming carried by cable systems in the same manner as the Tribunal has done.
I
The Genesis of the Statutory Fee Schedule and
the Tribunal's Rate Review Authority
When Congress adopted the cable television provisions of
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, it tilted in favor of the cable
industry. To be sure, Congress required cable operators, for
the first time in their 25-year history, to pay for copyrighted
on issues affecting the cable compulsory license. The bill which reflected this compromise, H.R. 5949, retained the compulsory license but imposed certain restrictions on
cable similar to the FCC's former syndicated exclusivity rules and its current rules
which require the carriage of local television stations. See generally Copyright/Cable
Television: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1982). The bill passed the House but died in the Senate during the final days of the
97th Congress, when, among other things, the NCTA attempted to amend the bill to

overturn the Tribunal's rate increase. See generally Cable Copyright and Signal Carriage Act of 1982: Joint Hearingson H.R. 5949 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportationand the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as "1982 Joint Hearings"].
14. See, e.g., H.R. 2902, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (exempting the first three distant in-

dependent television signals from the new rates); S. 1270, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (exempting satellite-delivered "superstation" WTBS-TV from the new rates).
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television programming. But Congress took the rather extraordinary step of affording cable a compulsory license. 15 And
it established statutorily a fee schedule which, in its estimation, would produce only "modest" royalty payments to copyright owners. Congress' estimate has proven to be accurate.
During the years 1978-1982, cable's compulsory licensing payments have amounted to less than one percent of the industry's total operating revenues,16-or, as one party has noted,
less than what the industry pays for postage to bill its
7
subscribers.1
The legislative history, as discussed below, explains the derivation and bases of the statutory rates. The specific rates were
chosen arbitrarily, as part of a political compromise, and without regard to the marketplace value of the programming affected. Generally, however, they were geared to what the
cable industry of the early to mid-1970's said it was willing and
able to afford in light of: (1) the industry's depressed financial
condition; (2) the uncertain ability of the industry to expand
(particularly in large urban markets); and (3) the heavy costs
imposed by substantial FCC regulation, much of which was
designed to protect copyright owners. Congress required copyright owners to subsidize an embryonic cable industry, largely
because cable was the only technology on the horizon that appeared capable of providing the American public with added
program diversity. The expectation was that the Tribunal
would be free to set new rates (albeit for a limited category of
distant signal programming) in light of changes in these industry conditions.
A.

The Initial Fee Schedule-S. 543 (1969)

Efforts to revise the 1909 Copyright Act formally began in
1955, some five years after the first cable system began retrans15. As David Ladd, Register of Copyrights, has observed: "A compulsory license
mechanism is in derogation of the rights of authors and copyright owners. It should be
utilized only if compelling reasons support its existence." Oversight of the Copyright
Act of 1976 (Cable Television): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1981) [hereinafter cited as "1981 Senate Hearings"].
16. The cable industry's revenues during this period were approximately $14.1 billion. See infra authorities cited in note 93. The compulsory licensing payments during
the same period were approximately $91.5 million. Statement of Register of Copyrights Before Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 13 (March 3, 1983). The figures reported by the
Register do not include payments for the second half of 1982.
17. 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 200 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
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mitting television signals. But it was not until the mid-1960's
that any attempt was made to deal legislatively with cable's
copyright liability for the use of copyrighted television programming.1 8 Bills introduced between 1964 and 1969 generally
imposed full or at least partial copyright liability upon cable. 9
None made provision for compulsory licensing of television
programming by cable.
On January 22, 1969, Senator John McClellan, Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, introduced S. 543, which constituted a comprehensive
revision of the copyright laws. This bill was referred to Senator McClellan's Subcommittee, and subsequently was reported
to the full Senate Judiciary Committee. As reported, S. 543
contained three provisions concerning cable which signifi-

cantly departed from earlier bills.
First, cable systems were afforded a compulsory license to
retransmit all local television signals and any additional signals necessary to ensure that their communities receive "adequate television service." The term "adequate television
service" was defined in such a way as to permit cable systems
to import only a limited number of distant signals.20 In addi18. See House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 40 (Comm. Print 1965). The
Register recommended to the House Judiciary Committee in 1965 that cable systems
be subject to full copyright liability. Id. at 42.
19. During this same period, both the FCC and the courts considered the issues
surrounding cable retransmission of television signals. In 1966, the FCC adopted a rule
which essentially froze the importation of distant signals into the top 100 markets. See
Second Report and Order in Docket Nos. 14895, 15233 and 15971, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966),
affd, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). In 1968, the United States Supreme Court determined
that, under the Copyright Act of 1909, cable operators do not incur copyright liability
for their retransmission of local television signals. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). The FCC then proposed to lift its freeze upon the
condition that the cable operator obtain "retransmission consent" from the originating
broadcaster. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket No. 18397, 15 F.C.C.2d 417,
para. 38 (1968); Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 18397, 22 F.C.C.2d 589
(1969).
20. Under the concept of "adequate television service," cable systems in the nation's 50 largest television markets were given a compulsory license to import only
those distant signals needed to supply cable subscribers with three network, one educational and three independent stations; local signals were counted against these quotas. There were even greater restrictions on distant signal importation in markets
below the top 50.
In providing "adequate television service" to communities within television markets,
cable systems generally were required to carry the signals of those stations closest to
the cable system. S. 543 extended the compulsory license to carriage of all radio sig-
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tion, certain programming was excluded from the scope of the
compulsory license-specifically, all distant signal professional
sports programming and distant signal syndicated programming which was licensed to a broadcaster within the cable

community.
Second, the bill established a graduated schedule of compulsory licensing royalty fees, which required payments of between 1 to 5 percent of the cable systems' "gross receipts."'"
The bill permitted the FCC to increase the number of signals
comprising "adequate television service," but imposed a one
percent surcharge for each additional signal.2 2 No explanation
was given as to how the precise fee schedule in S. 543 was derived, although the Subcommittee strongly suggested that its
fee schedule was favorable to cable.2 3
nals. Cable systems serving areas outside of any U.S. television market were afforded
a compulsory license to carry any signals.
21. The schedule was:
(i) 1 percent of any gross receipts up to $40,000;
(ii) 2 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $40,000, but not more
than $80,000;
(iii) 3 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $80,000, but not more
than $120,000;
(iv) 4 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $120,000, but not more
than $160,000; and
(v) 5 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $160,000.
"Gross receipts" were defined as payments from subscribers for the basic service of
providing secondary transmissions. Income received from the installation of equipment or advertising accompanying cable-originated programming was excluded from
the computation of gross receipts. Senate Judiciary Comm., Draft Report to Accompany S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as "S. Dr. Rep."].
22. S. Dr. Rep., supra note 21, at 30. Shortly after the Subcommittee reported S.
543, the FCC proposed an alternative fee schedule in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
The copyright fee was to be calculated according to the reduction in value of programming to program suppliers, resulting from audience fractionalization and loss of program exclusivity. Also, in order to permit copyright owners to share in cable profits,
cable systems would have been required to pay the same amount for programming per
cable home as did the average broadcast station per television home. The fee would
have been assessed as a percentage of subscriber revenue per distant signal. The fee,
approximately $2.11 per subscriber, would have been substantially higher than that
proposed in S. 543. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket 18397-A,
24 F.C.C.2d 580, 589 (1970).
23. The Subcommittee noted that it had sought to "recognize the proper interests
of copyright proprietors and primary broadcasting transmitters"; however, "the overriding consideration must be the public interest in securing access to a larger number
of television channels and a greater variety of programming." S. Dr. Rep., supra note
21, at 24. The Subcommittee also noted that it had wanted to be certain that the public
would obtain "the benefit[s] of the advances in communication technology," (id.) and
that it had to take account of the fact that cable systems would "be paying copyright
royalties for the first time." Id. at 87. Finally, the Subcommittee emphasized its con-
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Third, S. 543 created the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. Among
other things, the Tribunal was authorized to conduct rate adjustment proceedings (commencing in 1974 and every five
years thereafter) "to assure that [the cable royalty] rates continue to be reasonable. 2 4 The bill provided the Tribunal with
no guidance on how a reasonable rate should be calculated.
The Subcommittee acknowledged that it had very limited economic data on the cable industry and that: "Although all indications signify a substantial growth of the cable industry,
reliable projections of the extent of such growth are difficult to
make. '25 The Subcommittee therefore stated that the fee
schedule could be adjusted in "light of [these] subsequent developments. ' 26 The Subcommittee also noted that its choice of
rates had been influenced by a variety of considerations2 7 and
concluded: "While these considerations influenced the committee's determination as to what constitutes reasonable rates
at the present time, [they] in no way restrict the independence
of the Tribunal to recommend adjustment of these rates to assure that the rates are 'reasonable' according to whatever criteria the Tribunal deems appropriate. 2 8
S. 543 died in the 91st Congress. Another copyright revision
bill (S. 644) essentially identical to S. 543 was introduced by
Senator McClellan on February 8, 1971. This bill died in the
92d Congress.
B.

The 1973 Senate Hearings

On March 26, 1973, Senator McClellan introduced S. 1361,
which had the same fee schedule and Tribunal rate review provisions as those in S. 543 and S. 644. The hearings that Senator
McClellan's Subcommittee held on S. 136129 were most instrucern with adopting a fee schedule that "recognizes . . . the special concerns of small
systems ....
" Id. at 29.
24. Id. at 87. As originally conceived, the Tribunal was not a continuing federal
agency. Rather, the Register of Copyrights was authorized to appoint, from time to
time, three-member panels nominated by the American Arbitration Association to
serve as the Tribunal. The Tribunal's decisions were subject to Congressional, but not
judicial, review.
25. Id. at 29.
26. Id.
27. These considerations are outlined in note 23 supra.
28. S. Dr. Rep., supra note 21, at 87.
29. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks,and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as "1973 Senate Hearings"].
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mental in shaping the ultimate fee schedule."
During the hearings, the copyright owners urged that the
Tribunal, and not Congress, establish the initial fee schedule.
In doing so, they emphasized the arbitrary nature of the fees in
S. 1361. For example, Jack Valenti, President of the MPAA,
testified that:
[WI e are not aware of any economic evidence of any kind that
corroborates the fee schedule which is in S. 1361. To our
knowledge, there [have] been no factfinding efforts of any
[k]ind which preceded the insertion of that fee schedule in S.
1361. There is no kinship in these fees ...

to the reasonable

value of the copyrighted programs that we produce .... 31
The copyright owners were concerned that the inclusion of an
arbitrarily chosen fee schedule in the statute would prejudice
any adjustment of the rates by the Tribunal.3 2 They also noted
that the establishment of an appropriate fee schedule involves
a number of complex considerations, and that Congress simply
does not have the time or resources to engage in the necessary
30. The Subcommittee approached its consideration of the S. 1361 fee schedule
from the background of an earlier agreement reached by cable and copyright interests.
In November of 1971 the NCTA, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), and
the Committee of Copyright Owners (consisting in large part of the members of the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)) entered into the so-called "Consensus Agreement." Among other things, the Consensus Agreement provided that the
parties would attempt to negotiate a schedule of compulsory licensing fees for inclusion in the new copyright statute; if the negotiations were unsuccessful, the legislation
was supposed to provide for mandatory arbitration.
The agreement provided for the lifting of many distant signal carriage restrictions,
and for support of subsequent cable copyright legislation granting a compulsory license for all local signals and for all distant signals (as defined at that time by the
FCC). However, any distant signals to be authorized by the FCC in the future were
not to be subject to compulsory licensing.
In 1972, the FCC adopted much of the Consensus Agreement, and liberalized its
rules governing cable television. The rules lifted the freeze that had been imposed on
distant signal importation, although they still limited the number of distant signals
that could be carried. The 1972 changes also included syndicated program exclusivity
rules, which permitted a local television station which had contracted for exhibition
rights to a syndicated program to demand that a cable system delete that program
from its offerings into the local station's market. See Cable Television Report and Order in Docket Nos. 18397; 18397A; 18373; 18416; 18892; 18894, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
31. 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 280. The NAB and the Association of
Maximum Service Telecasters similarly stated: "As the NCTA representatives who
testified before this Subcommittee on August 1 expressly recognized, this fee schedule
is necessarily arbitrary, since no Congressional hearings or studies have been conducted on the appropriate fee levels for cable systems and since the questions involved are both novel and complex." Id. at 625.
32. See id. at 288, 300 (testimony and statement of Jack Valenti).
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inquiry."3 3
Various members of the Senate expressed similar concerns.' The cable industry likewise acknowledged the arbitrary nature of the fees in S. 1361. According to David Foster,
President of the NCTA, it was necessary "to accept some degree of arbitrariness with this initial fee schedule. 3 5s The
NCTA claimed that it was impossible to adduce any facts at the
time which would justify a particular rate structure, and that
Congress' judgment as to the appropriate rates would be preferable to that of an administrative body. 36 The NCTA explained that the necessary facts would not exist until the cable
industry had some experience with making copyright payments-and, particularly, until it could be determined how successful the cable industry would be.3 7
33. Id. at 280-81 (testimony of Jack Valenti).
34. Senator McClellan, for example, observed: "[If both sides take the position
that they do not want to submit anything for our consideration, for us to evaluate, it
seems to me that we are going to be left here, if we do undertake to fix fees, [to] just
take something out of the air that appeals to us." Id. at 284. Senator John Tunney, in a
letter addressed to Senator McClellan, likened the Tribunal to various rate-setting
bodies, arguing that: "What all [of] these rate-setting procedures have in common is
that they involve complex facts and economic impact considerations which would
make it too burdensome for the Congress to devote the time and staff efforts necessary
to do justice to the parties concerned. . . ." Id. at 668. Senator Alan Cranston, also in
a letter, said: "I do question whether sufficient study has been made of appropriate fee
levels to be certain that those contained in the bill are the fairest and most equitable
for all parties." Id. at 584.
35. Id. at 410.
36. "[Slufficient empirical data simply does not presently exist to permit arbitrators to fairly establish an initial fee schedule." Id. at 420 (statement of NCTA). "[WIe
came to the conclusion that there was no factual basis [for any particular fee schedule] and, therefore, it was appropriate to turn this matter over to the wisdom of this
committee and the Senate to come up with a fee schedule." Id. at 399 (testimony of
David Foster).
37. The NCTA submitted the following statement:
In other words, the CATV industry still has little evidence on how well it will
do in the bigger cities, or whether, in fact, it will do well at all. Such data will
not be available in any meaningful quantity for a few years.
What does exist, in great quantity, are projections of CATV's growth in the
cities. These projections vary widely from rosy optimism to gloomy pessimism. These are educated guesses at best. Since there are a few facts, and
much speculation, arbitration at this time would be mere conjecture. The only
logical way to proceed is for the Congress to set an initial, moderate set of fees
with arbitration after facts have been developed.
Id. at 420-21; see also id. at 399 (testimony of David Foster):
By setting down an initial fee schedule in the bill, the concept of arbitration
could then come into effect at a time when we would, hopefully, have some
hard factual data based upon the experiences derived over the next 3 years.
During that period of time, we will be paying copyright fees and we will have
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The cable interests supported S. 1361 insofar as it established the initial schedule of royalties. However, they complained that the schedule was too high and that, at the least, it
should be cut in half.3 8 According to the NCTA, "we feel that
these fees should be minimal at the outset, and that the economics of the marketplace [should] show what they might be
in the future."3 9 The NCTA emphasized that:
[C] able television is still in its infancy. It is a very, very small
industry. It is primarily operating in rural areas, in smalltown
areas, and the major big-city markets . . . have not yet been
wired.4°
The NCTA explained that the real future of cable lay in the
major urban markets, and that the S. 1361 fee schedule, along

with other factors, would inhibit growth particularly in these
41
areas.

The NCTA submitted a study which had been prepared by
Dr. Bridger Mitchell of the Rand Corporation. This study, commissioned by the NCTA, sought to assess the "profitability of
cable television in the major markets under the final [1972]
experienced the copyright payment concept. The allocation of those fees can
be worked out. The economic impact of those fees on our industry will become apparent. And we think that it is then the appropriate time for the statutory tribunal to do its work.
If that tribunal were to be convened today, it would have the same difficulties that the parties had during the past 2 years trying to conduct negotiations-they would simply be speculating as to the future of this industry, but
they wouldn't be dealing with anything except one economist theorizing from
one direction and another economist theorizing from the opposite direction.
What would come up would be certainly no more valid, and I suspect a lot less
valid, than the wisdom of the Senate.
38. Id. at 397, 423 (testimony and statement of Foster). Copyright owners, however, thought that the fee schedule was too low. In a written statement filed with the
Subcommittee, Jack Valenti asserted: "In fact, these fees are grossly inadequate and
represent only a small fraction of what the copyright owners feel would be fair and
compensatory fees." Id. at 298 (statement of Jack Valenti). A study conducted on behalf of the Committee of Copyright Owners concluded that the cable industry could
afford copyright payments of more than 13 percent. Id. at 316 (summary of study of
Crandall/Fray).
39. Id. at 400 (testimony of David Foster) (emphasis added). See also id. at 488
(statement of George Barco, Pennsylvania Cable Television Association) "[Nlo copyright payment should be imposed which cannot be absorbed by the industry without
passing the copyright charges to the subscriber." (Emphasis in original.)
40. Id. at 398-99 (testimony of David Foster).
41. Id. at 420-21 (statement of NCTA). See also id. at 488 (statement of Pennsylvania Cable Television Association "[A] proper concernfor the future growth and
development of cable television and the services it provides to the public, demands that
any copyright payment should be such that payment does not restrain,impede or burden the industry'sgrowth and development." (Emphasis in original.)
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FCC rules and determine[d] the impact of alternative copyright fee schedules which have been proposed. '42 Mitchell
concluded that the fee schedule in S. 1361 would lower the
rates of return of cable systems in major markets to a point
where investment in such systems would be unlikely:
ITihe prospective returns to cable investors are only marginally attractive when compared with other industries, and then
only on the suburban fringes of most cities. In this situation,
copyright fees of the magnitude proposed in S. 1361 can be a
significant deterrent to construction of many new systems.
. .The impact of even the copyright fee schedule proposed in
the bill before this committee may well be sufficient to delay or
cancel construction of an important proportion of systems that
would otherwise be built in the next several years.43
Mitchell further concluded that a fee schedule set at 50 percent
of that contained in S. 1361 would not have as substantial an
impact upon cable.
The NCTA also presented statistics on the effect that the S.
1361 fee schedule would have upon the nation's largest multiple cable system operators (MSOs), whose success was critical
to the development of cable in the major markets.' According
to the NCTA, the S. 1361 fee schedule would reduce the pre-tax
income of the eight MSOs which it surveyed by nearly 20 percent. This, the NCTA claimed, would have a "serious adverse
effect on the already limited ability of these companies to borrow funds from investment sources. ' 45 The consequence, in
the NCTA's judgment, would be that the "pace of new system
development is bound to suffer and further contribute to the
already delayed development of cable television in our major
cities. ''
*

42. Id. at 429 (testimony of Dr. Bridger Mitchell). David Foster of the NCTA summarized the Mitchell study as demonstrating that the S. 1361 fee schedule "will provide
marginal profitability for cable television systems. And even a schedule of half that
much would encourage some profitability, but not a great deal." Id. at 409. The Mitchell study concluded that a copyright fee of one to five percent of gross revenues, as
provided in S. 1361, would reduce the rate of return for the largest systems from 11
percent to about 10 percent. The study further concluded that a fee of 16.5 percent of
gross revenues, as proposed by the copyright owners, would reduce the rate of return
to the point of unprofitability for every type of cable system studied. Id. at 403 (testimony of Dr. Bridger Mitchell).
43. Id. at 403.
44. Id. at 422.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also id. at 667 (letter from Teleprompter Corporation).
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Revision of the Fee Schedule and Tribunal Authority--S. 1361
(July 1974)

The success of cable's lobbying was apparent when the full
Judiciary Committee reported S. 1361 in July of 1974.47 As
urged by the cable industry, the Judiciary Committee reduced
the rates originally set in S. 543 and S. 1361 by one-half." The
Committee also eliminated the surcharge of one percent assessed against distant signals that might be added as a result
of changes in the definition of "adequate television service.
Not only were the rates reduced, but the scope of the programming subject to compulsory licensing was broadened substantially. Distant signal professional sports programming and
syndicated programming no longer were excluded from compulsory licensing. In addition, cable systems no longer were
limited to carrying local signals and those few distant signals
necessary to constitute "adequate television service." Under
the revised bill, cable systems received a compulsory license to
carry any signals authorized by the FCC's more liberal rules.5 0
In short, the bill as reported would result in cable's paying significantly less for significantly more programming than under
the bill as introduced. In the report accompanying S. 1361, the
Judiciary Committee explained:
Because the cable television industry has not been paying
copyright royalties for its secondary transmissions, very little
relevant economic data was available to the Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights when it established the
47. Shortly after the Subcommittee completed its hearings, the United States
Supreme Court ruled again on the cable copyright issue, holding that cable systems
were not liable for copyright infringement in importing and retransmitting distant television signals. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). The Court previously had determined in its 1968 Fortnightly decision that cable systems were not
liable for copyright infringement in carrying local signals (see supra note 19).
48. Section 111(d) (2) (B) of the revised S. 1361 required the following quarterly
payments:
(i) 1/2 percent of any gross receipts up to $40,000;
(ii) 1 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $40,000, but not more
than $80,000;
(iii) 1-1/2 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $80,000, but not
more than $120,000;
(iv) 2 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $120,000, but not more
than $160,000; and
(v) 2-1/2 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $160,000.
49. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 30. The FCC rules, although considered restrictive by the cable
industry, permitted carriage of distant signals to a greater extent than under the concept of "adequate television service."
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schedule of royalty payments in S. 543. The Subcommittee in
1973 had a hearing on the royalty schedule previously approved
by the Subcommittee and contained in S. 1361. At this hearing
the program producers, broadcasters and music performing
rights societies expressed opposition to the inclusion of a royalty schedule in the statute. The cable television industry supported the Congress initially determining the royalty
payments to be made by cable television systems but expressed concern that the rates in the bill might be too high and
thus handicap the development of the cable television industry. The Committee believes that the economic data available
at the present time is inconclusive but supports the Congress
initially establishing royalty rates .... 51

Certain changes also were made with respect to the Tribunal's authority to review the royalty rates. 5 2 Under S. 1361 as
introduced, the Tribunal's mandate was to adjust the rates so
that they would "continue to be reasonable." As revised, section 801(b) of S. 1361 directed the Tribunal to assure that the
rates "are reasonable." Presumably, the Committee wanted to
make clear that it had expressed no judgment as to whether
the statutory rates are "reasonable" within the meaning of the

rate review provisions. 3 In fact, in the accompanying report,
51. S. Rep, No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as "S. Rep.
93-983").
52. Section 801(b) (1) of the bill provided that the purpose of the Tribunal shall be
[to] make determinations concerning the adjustment of the copyright royalty
rates specified by sections 111, 114, 115, and 116 so as to assure that such rates
are reasonable and in the event that the Tribunal shall determine that the
statutory royalty rate, or a rate previously established by the Tribunal, or the
revenue basis in respect to section 111, does not provide a reasonable royalty
fee for the basic service of providing secondary transmissions of the primary
broadcast transmitter or is otherwise unreasonable, the Tribunal may change
the royalty rate or the revenue bases on which the royalty fee shall be assessed or both so as to assure a reasonable royalty fee ....
The provision that the Tribunal be permitted to adjust the revenue bases was recommended by the copyright owners, who were concerned that cable might reduce their
royalty payments simply by reducing their basic service charge and increasing nonbasic charges. See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 302 (statement of Jack
Valenti).
53. This revision had been requested by the MPAA at the 1973 Hearings: "Well, if
we're going to have S. 1361 as it is, then this must be that the fees must be adjusted
reasonably, not to continue, because at this point we do not believe that they are reasonable." 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 283 (testimony of Jack Valenti). In
his written submission, Jack Valenti emphasized the relationship between the proposed revision and the ultimate role of the Tribunal in reviewing the fees:
I urge that this language be changed ....
Only thus will the Tribunal at the
periodic review of the rates be able to proceed to an open and fair determination without any implication such as that contained in Section 801 as presently
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the Committee specifically stated that it "does not intend that
the rates in this legislation shall be regarded as precedents in
'54
future proceedings of the Tribunal.
The Senate passed S. 1361 and referred it to the House Judiciary Committee. The bill, however, died in the 93d Congress.
D.

1975 House Hearings

Two bills were introduced into the 94th Congress with rate
schedules and review provisions essentially identical to S.
136 155_-S. 22, which was sponsored by Senator McClellan; and
H.R. 2223, which was sponsored by Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary
Committee. Representative Kastenmeier held hearings on
H.R. 2223 between May and December of 1975.56 These hearings also were quite instrumental in shaping the ultimate
legislation.
During the hearings the cable industry renewed its support
for the inclusion of a fee schedule in the copyright legislation.
Rex Bradley, Chairman of the NCTA, noted that the schedule
in the pending bills did not have a "scientific foundation" and
that it represented a "political, arbitrary decision. ' 57 According to Mr. Bradley, the fee schedule was "arrived at from the
basis of representations by various persons that the industry
could presumably pay this amount";5 8 "in paying on this schedule we are paying as much as we can be reasonably expected
worded that the royalty rates initially set in the statute were deemed "reasonable" when they were initially adopted.
Id. at 302.
54. S. Rep. 93-983, supra note 51, at 203. Under the revised bill, the Tribunal also
was permitted to adjust the rates at an earlier date than under prior bills. Section
802 (a) provided for the commencement of a rate adjustment proceeding on July 1, 1975,
or one year after the date on which the Judiciary Committee reported S. 1361. The
early review date represented something of a trade-off for the pro-cable revisions
which had been made to S. 1361.
55. Like S. 1361, the new bills included a graduated fee schedule of one-half that
originally proposed. Additionally, cable systems had a compulsory license to carry all
signals authorized by the FCC, including sports and syndicated programming, and the
Tribunal had the power to adjust both the rate and basis of the copyright fee schedule.
56. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as "1975 House Hearings"].
57. Id. at 492.
58. Id.
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to pay. .. .
The NCTA acknowledged that the proposed fees were not
"excessive."6 However, it sought further inroads.6 ' Specifically, the NCTA opposed the provisions in the bill which would
authorize the Tribunal to review the royalty rates established
in the legislation. 2 Mr. Bradley explained that the "Tribunal
carries with it the potential for substantial escalation of copyright fees ... *"63 This, Mr. Bradley stated, created "uncertainty" which posed a "very serious threat to the future
viability of the cable television industry."64 The industry was
concerned about the effect that such uncertainty might have
on the willingness of the financial community to invest in
cable.6 5
The NCTA presented the testimony of David Wicks of
Warburg Paribas Becker, Inc., one of the "principal sources of
CATV financing."66 Wicks reiterated the contention of cable
representatives that the industry was far from profitable, noting that the nine leading cable companies had lost a total of
over $16 million during the past year alone. 67 He emphasized
that a major impediment to cable profitability was the more
59. Id.
60. Id. at 512.
61. In order to protect smaller systems, NCTA proposed that the first $25,000 in
gross quarterly subscriber receipts be exempt from royalty calculations. Id. at 487.
This would have exempted 50 percent of the industry from all payments. Id. at 491.
62. NCTA also objected to the language in H.R. 2223 giving the Tribunal power to
adjust the revenue basis for copyright fees (see supra note 52), and submitted "suggested clarifying language" to eliminate that provision. 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 56, at 489, 508. NCTA was supported in this position by Barbara Ringer, Register
of Copyrights. Id. at 1824. The cable industry also was concerned with the extent of
the power H.R. 2223 granted to the Tribunal to adjust copyright fees. NCTA's Mr. Bradley argued: "Chapter 8 contains no criteria to guide Tribunal review of rates; it contains no provision for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision other than for fraud;
and in our opinion it provides for no effective Congressional review." Id. at 504. In
addition, the Teleprompter Corporation submitted a study by Professor Ernest Gellhorn of the University of Virginia Law School arguing that H.R. 2223 was constitutionally defective because the Tribunal was given no "meaningful guidelines" for resetting
the statutory rates, and judicial review of Tribunal decisions was "sharply and unwisely" curtailed. Id. at 1921.
63. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 56, at 485. In response to this concern, the
Register of Copyrights had recommended that Congress place "a specific percentage
limit on the amount the fees could be increased by the Tribunal on a particular occasion." Id. at 1825. The Register's recommendation was never adopted.
64. Id. at 485, 486.
65. Id. at 492-93.
66. Id. at 607.
67. Id. at 607-08.
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than $400 million in capital required to bring systems into compliance with the FCC's 1972 technical requirements.68 In
Wicks' opinion, the cable fees proposed in H.R. 2223 would
have a "substantial and adverse" effect on the net income of
cable operators. He concluded: "The combined effect of the liability imposed by the bill for copyright royalty payments, together with uncertainty as to the future level of these
payments, will operate to substantially reduce the availability
of both debt and equity financing." 69
In October of 1975, the Teleprompter Corporation, one of the
nation's largest MSOs, proffered a proposal which ultimately
would affect the nature of the statutory fee schedule. The essence of the proposal was that cable operators should be required to pay only for the nonnetwork programming on distant
signals. 70 The proposal attempted to assign a value to individual distant signals based on the popularity of the programming. It then correlated the rate to be paid to the percentage of
revenues paid by broadcasters for programming. The Teleprompter proposal originally was objected to not only by the
broadcasters and copyright owners, but also by most of the
cable industry. 71 As discussed below, the nonnetwork distinction was incorporated into the legislation as enacted; the suggestion that copyright fees be related to some indicia of
marketplace value (here, programming popularity) was not.
E. Senate Passage of S. 22 (February 1976)
In February 1976, the Senate passed S. 22 and referred it to
the House Judiciary Committee. No significant changes were
made in the bill that had been introduced by Senator McClel68. Id. at 599.
69. Id. at 598.
70. Id. at 1918 (memorandum of Teleprompter Corp.). The Office of Telecommunications Policy, the Justice Department, and the Register of Copyrights supported the
distinction between local and distant signals. Id. at 453, 143, 146,153, and 1822-23 (statements of Thomas J. Keller, Irwin Goldbloom and Barbara Ringer). NCTA also supported the distinction, but declared it was unable to devise a schedule which could
adequately take it into account. Id. at 2048 (statement of Rex Bradley).
The rationale underlying the nonnetwork distinction was that the copyright owners
of network programming are compensated by the networks on the basis of their works
reaching the entire nation; cable systems should not be required to provide double
compensation to copyright owners under these circumstances. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1976).
71. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 56, at 1935, 1937, 1952 (statements of Pennsylvania Cable Television Association, CATA and Jack Valenti).
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lan-except that the royalty fees for systems with less than
$160,000 in annual receipts were reduced.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 22 noted the
uncertain basis for the percent fee schedule in language similar to that found in earlier reports: "Because the cable television industry has not been paying copyright royalties for its
secondary transmissions, very little relevant economic data
was available to the Subcommittee .... The committee believes that the economic data available at the present time is
inconclusive . . . .-73 The Report further noted: "The royalty
rates currently in the bill, following an across the board cut in
half, were adopted in the expectation that they would be subject to review at an early date. 7 4 The Report also repeated earlier admonitions that the statutory rates were not to be
"regarded as precedents in the future proceedings of the Tribunal," and that the considerations which prompted the statutory
rates "in no way restrict the independence of the Tribunal to
recommend adjustment of these rates to assure that the rates
are 'reasonable' according to whatever criteria the Tribunal
deems appropriate. 7 5
F. ,NCTA/MPAA Compromise (April 1976)
In April of 1976, the MPAA (without the participation of
other affected parties) entered into a compromise agreement
with the NCTA which was to provide the basis for copyright
legislation. The MPAA's participation was motivated by a concern that copyright legislation once again would die in Con72. The purpose of this amendment, introduced by Senator Hathaway on the floor
of the Senate, was to protect smaller cable systems. The amendment provided for
computation of a fee for smaller systems to be based on only part of the system's actual gross receipts. The minimum payment was to be at least $30 annually. 122 Cong.
Rec. 3833 (1976). During the floor debates Senator McClellan stated that he would
agree to the small system amendment proposed by Senator Hathaway, but with reservation. He stated
I was not going to vote for any amendment that would further reduce the fees,
because we have them quite low now. We have been reducing these all along
from the time we started. But since this amendment now is so modified that it
will only apply to those very small stations or cable systems where there is
gross receipts of only $160,000 a year, or less, I am not going to further oppose
the amendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
73. S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "S. Rep.
94-473"].
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id. at 155.
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gress, and that the cable industry would make further inroads
in the legislation.76
Under the agreement, cable systems would incur copyright
liability only for carriage of distant nonnetwork programming.77 The compromise represented the first time that cable
and copyright interests had agreed to distinct copyright treatment for carriage of distant, nonnetwork programs, as had originally been proposed by the Teleprompter Corporation. 78 This
concept was incorporated into the compulsory licensing rate
schedule to which the parties agreed. The rate was expressed
as a percentage of basic subscriber revenues, assessed against
each "imported signal equivalent. ' 79

While representing a

novel approach, the fee schedule was devised to result in a total industry payment which would have equalled for the year
1976 the payment which would have been required by S. 22-that is, $8.7 million.80
76. 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 216-17 (statement of Jack Valenti). The
agreement is published in the 1975 House Hearings, supra note 56, at 2188-90.
77. The agreement defined a "distant signal" as "one which is not required to be
carried under present FCC rules." Generally speaking, the FCC requires cable sys-

tems to carry only local signals.
78. See text accompanying notes 70-71.
79. Each independent and specialty station was counted as a full signal; ndtwork

and educational stations were counted as one-quarter of a signal to reflect the reduced
amount of nonnetwork programming broadcast by them. The rate schedule was:
.6percent of basic subscriber revenues for the first imported equivalent signal;
.425 percent of basic subscriber revenues for each of the second, third and
fourth imported equivalent signals; and
.2 percent of basic subscriber revenues for each imported equivalent signal in
excess of four.
All systems would pay .6 percent of subscriber revenues for the privilege of importing distant signals, even if none were in fact carried by the system. Small cable systems (those with less than $160,000 in annual receipts) were subject to decreased
copyright payments, as under S. 22 as passed by the Senate.
The agreement further provided that each distant signal would be subject to the rate
schedule "regardless of the amount of that signal's programming which is actually carried by the subject cable systems." The only exceptions to this rule were: (1) programming which was substituted for that blacked out pursuant to the FCC's
syndicated exclusivity rules; (2) programming carried only during late night hours
pursuant to FCC rules; and (3) signals carried on a part-time basis only because the
system lacked sufficient channel capacity for full-time carriage. No additional payments were required for the first category; the remaining two categories generated royalties based upon the number of hours of programming actually carried.
80. A vice president of NCTA active in the compromise negotiations testified
before the Tribunal: "The $8.7 million was the amount [in] the Senate bill S. 22, which
was based on a straight percentage of revenue fee[s] ....

The objective throughout

all of the research and [the] attempt to structure a fee schedule was. . . to reach this
$8.7 million." Testimony of Kathryn Creech at 117, 119 in CRT Docket No. 80-3 (Nov. 13,
1980).
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The agreement also reflected a new approach to the role of
the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. The Tribunal was empowered
to review the compulsory licensing rates only under limited
circumstances; it could adjust the rates only to account for inflation or future changes in the FCC's distant signal and syndicated programming exclusivity rules." The inflation rate
adjustment was to take place in 1980 and every five years thereafter. However, the Tribunal could undertake, upon petition,
immediate review of royalty rates in the event of an applicable
FCC rule change.
Rates established in such a proceeding were to be applied
only to the distant signal programming carried as a result of
the FCC rule changes.2 The agreement did not set forth any
81. The Tribunal's authority was limited to adjusting the rates alone, and not the
revenue base on which these rates are calculated. See supra note 52. The parties also
agreed that Tribunal determinations would be subject to judicial review only. There
no longer was any provision for Congressional review.
82. Paragraph 5 of the agreement provided that: "Any change in the FCC exclusivity rules will enable the Tribunal to adjust the statutory royalty rates insofar as they
relate to cable systems and signals affected by the change."
Paragraph 6 provided:
Any change in the FCC's rules which permit additional distant signals to be
carried will enable the Tribunal to reconsider royalty rates applicable to (but
only to) such additional signals. However, the original statutory rates are
"grandfathered" in each of the following instances:
(i) in the case of any signal presently carried;
(ii) in the case of any signal substituted for a signal presently carried, provided that the substituted signal is the same 'class' *** as the signal for
which it is substituted;
(iii) in the case of any signal (whether or not now carried) which would be
permitted to be carried by the FCC rules as now in force; and
(iv) in the case of any signal subsequently permitted to be carried because of
an individual waiver of the FCC's existing rules.
*
All television signals are divided into four classes: (i) network signals;
(ii) noncommercial educational signals; (iii) independent signals and
(iv) specialty stations.
When the parties subsequently drafted amendments to S. 22, they added a new section 801(b) (2) (B) which was intended to reflect Paragraph 6 of the compromise. With
one exception (see infra text accompanying notes 87-88) the language of the amendment was word-for-word the same as that which currently appears in section
801(b) (2) (B) of the Act-but different from that which appeared in Paragraph 6 of the
compromise. For example, the draft amendment omitted all reference to specialty stations-perhaps because the amendment referred specifically to FCC rules in effect on
April 15, 1976 and the FCC's specialty station rules did not go into effect until four days
later, April 19, 1976. See Report and Order in Docket 20553, 58 F.C.C.2d 442, paras. 42-44
(1976). The draft amendment also contained language describing the categories of
grandfathered signals different from that in the compromise agreement. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that the parties intended to change the meaning of the compromise when they drafted the amendment to S. 22.
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criteria to guide the Tribunal's rate adjustment. Nor was there
anything in the agreement to suggest that the Tribunal's discretion would be different than that envisioned in the earlier
bills considered by Congress. In return for preserving the minimal royalty payments of S. 22 and severely restricting the
reach of the Tribunal's rate review authority, the NCTA agreed
to giving the Tribunal carte blanche to establish rates for the
deregulated distant signal programming.
G.

Enactment of Legislation (October 1976)

In September 1976, the House Judiciary Committee substantially amended S.22. The Committee adopted a new fee schedule, essentially as proposed in the MPAA/NCTA agreement.83
The Committee noted that the resulting royalty award would
amount to approximately $8.7 million in 1976 and that such
"payments are modest and will not retard the orderly development of the cable television industry .... 84
In addition, the Committee adopted the Tribunal review provisions as set forth in the MPAA/NCTA compromise.8" The
83. The Committee explained:
In setting an initial fee schedule, the Senate bill . . . rejected a statutory
scheme that would distinguish between "local" and "distant" signals ....
[However], the Committee has concluded that the copyright liability of cable
television systems under the compulsory license should be limited to the retransmission of distant nonnetwork programming. In implementing this conclusion, the Committee generally followed a proposal submitted by the cable
and motion picture industries ....
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as "H.R. Rep. 941476"].
The House Committee bill included some minor changes from the fee schedule proposed by the NCTA and MPAA in the compromise agreement. The percent of gross
receipts to be paid for the first distant signal equivalent and for the minimum basic
distant signal payment was raised from .006 to .00675. The small system exemption
also was changed. Under the Committee version of the bill, systems with under
$160,000 of gross receipts paid a flat percentage regardless of the number of distant
signals carried. Finally, at the request of the sports interests, the Committee required
a separate royalty payment if cable operators substituted live distant programming for
programming which they, at their option, deleted pursuant to the FCC rules. See 17
U.S.C. § 111(f) (1982).
84. H.R. Rep. 94-1476, supra note 83, at 91.
85. The House Committee made certain changes in the structure of the Tribunal.
Under S.22 as originally introduced, as in prior bills, the Tribunal was to consist of a
three-member panel of arbitrators appointed from time-to-time, as necessary, by the
Register of Copyrights. See S. Rep. 94-473, supra note 73, at 157; supra note 24. The
House Committee made the Tribunal into a permanent agency and changed its name
to the Copyright Royalty Commission. Expressing "constitutional concern" about having Tribunal members appointed by the Register of Copyrights, an employee of the
Legislative Branch, the House provided for Presidential appointment and five-year
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Tribunal was authorized to adjust the rates only to account for
inflation and FCC deregulation. With respect to the Tribunal's
authority to alter the rates if the FCC changed its rules restricting the carriage of distant signals, the House Report
states:
The purpose of this provision is to give the commission broad
discretion to reconsider the royalty rates applicable to (but
only to) the carriage of any additional distant signals permitted
under the rules and regulations of the FCC after April 15, 1976.
The present FCC rules limiting the number of distant signals
that may be carried by cable systems have the effect of protecting copyright owners by restricting the amount of television
broadcast programming retransmitted into distant markets. If
these rules are changes [sic I in the future to allow additional
cable carriage of television programs it is the Committee's
judgment that the royalty rates paid by cable systems should
be adjusted to reflect such changes.8 6
The House Committee made only one change in the deregulation rate review provision proposed by the MPAA and
NCTA-it provided the Tribunal with some limited guidance
on the factors that should be taken into account. Specifically,
the Committee directed the Tribunal to consider "among other
factors, the economic impact on copyright owners and users. '"87
terms. H.R. Rep. 94-1476, supra note 83, at 174. The House Committee also eliminated
Congressional review of the Tribunal's decisions, and permitted judicial review as
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 179. See generally Recording Industry
Ass'n of America v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
86. H.R. Rep. 94-1476, supra note 83, at 176 (emphasis added). As agreed in the
compromise, the bill permitted rate adjustment in the event of change in the FCC
rules on syndicated program exclusivity. The House Committee expanded this provision to authorize Tribunal review in the event of a change in the FCC rules restricting
cable carriage of sports programming. The Committee noted:
The syndicated and sports program exclusivity rules of the FCC have the effect of protecting copyright owners by restricting the cable carriage of certain
distant television programming. If these rules are changed in the future to
relax or increase the exclusivity restrictions, it is the Committee's judgment
that the royalty rates paid by cable systems should be adjusted to reflect such
changes.
Id. at 177.
87. Section 801(b) (2)'s failure to specify all of the appropriate factors that govern
the cable rate adjustment stands in stark contrast to other provisions of the Act which
vest the Tribunal with rate-setting authority. For example, in Section 801(b) (1), 17
U.S.C. § 801(b) (1) (1982), the Tribunal is empowered to adjust the phonorecord and
juke box royalty rates as set forth in Sections 115 and 116 of the Act. Congress, however, directed that these rates must be "calculated to achieve" the four objectives specifically enumerated in Section 801(b) (1). These objectives include "maximiz[ing] the
availability of creative works to the public" and "minimiz[ing] any disruptive impact
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The House Report amplifies upon this guidance:
In determining the reasonableness of rates under this provision, the Commission should consider, among other factors,
the economic impact that such adjustment may have on copyright owners and users, including broadcast stations, and the
effect of such additional distant signal equivalents, if any, on
local broadcasters' ability to serve the public. 88
On September 22, 1976, the House passed S. 22 essentially as
it had been amended by the Judiciary Committee. Immediately thereafter a Conference Committee was appointed to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate versions
of S. 22. The Conference Committee adopted the House
amendments to the fee schedule and Tribunal rate adjustment
authority.8 9 The bill as amended was passed by both Houses of
on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices." These criteria are not set forth in Section 801(b) (2) (B).
88. H.R. Rep. 94-1476, supra note 83, at 176. Representative Railsback originally
had suggested the following more detailed guidance:
In determining the reasonableness of rates proposed following an amendment of Federal Communications Commission rules and regulations, the Tribunal shall consider the criteria set forth in section 801(b) (2) (A) and the
following additional criteria, among others: the promotion of the progress of
science and the useful arts; a fair return to copyright owners without unfairly
burdening users; the economic impact on patterns of communications and the
general public interest in assuring the continuity and quality of broadcast
service without placing undue burden on the users of that service.
Both the MPAA and NCTA objected to Representative Railsback's guidance. See
Letter from Robert Schmidt to Representative Kastenmeier (May 28, 1976); Letter
from Jack Valenti to Representative Kastenmeier (June 1, 1976). The House Committee ultimately compromised by scaling the guidance down.
Originally, the House Report contained the following language: "It is the intent of
the Committee, however, that the Copyright Royalty Commission not be viewed or
used by the parties of interest as a forum to accomplish what they were unable to
accomplish before the FCC." This warning does not appear in any other House or
Senate report on the copyright legislation. And, in fact, it ultimately was deleted from
the House Report. During the floor debate on the legislation, Representative Railsback
stated:
On page 176 of the House Report No. 94-1476, we intended to delete the last
sentence on that page, but due to a mix-up at the printing office, it was not
deleted. The reason for its deletion is because it is confusing and would be
misunderstood. I would like to make clear for the record, since the language
in the record is reflecting my amendment, that the Federal Communications
Commission and the Copyright Royalty Commission are two entirely separate
commissions with entirely separate jurisdictions, proceedings and functions.
122 Cong. Rec. 31,984 (1976).
89. See H.R. Rep. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
"H.R. Rep. 94-1733"].
The Conference Committee also adopted, for the most part, the House provisions
concerning the structure of the Tribunal. See supra note 85. However, it determined
that the Tribunal would consist of five commissioners appointed for staggered seven-
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Congress on September 30, 1976, and signed into law by President Ford on October 19, 1976.

III

The Policy Implications Surrounding the
Compulsory Licensing Rates
As the legislative history of the Copyright Revision Act
makes clear, the "modest" royalties required by the statutory
fee schedule were thought to be justified by the various conditions that existed within the cable industry during the early to
mid-1970s. The Tribunal was created, at least in part, to respond to changes in these conditions by changing the statutory
rates. As ultimately enacted, the copyright legislation severely
restricted the applicability of the Tribunal's rate adjustment
authority; apart from inflation adjustments, the Tribunal had
power to set rates only for the distant signal programming carried as a consequence of FCC deregulation. Congress, however, vested the Tribunal with broad authority to reconsider
the rates applicable to this programming-without being limited by the arbitrarily chosen statutory rates or by the considerations which prompted these rates.
Under these circumstances, it would appear that the Tribunal did not contravene its statutory discretion by adopting
rates which are intended to replicate a free marketplace-even
though such rates are substantially higher than those in the
Act.9" The legislative history of the Copyright Revision Act
reveals a clear intent to permit the Tribunal to make its own
year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. In addition,
the Tribunal was created as an independent agency in the Legislative Branch. H.R.
Rep. 94-1733, supra, at 82.
90. Congress, of course, did direct the Tribunal to "consider" "among other factors" (which were unspecified) "economic impact upon copyright owners and users."
This mandate was perhaps adopted over concern that a total lack of guidance would
render the provision susceptible to constitutional challenge. See supra note 62. Or
perhaps it reflected the repeated arguments that any rates adopted by the Tribunal
should not impair cable's financial viability and, therefore, its ability to expand into the
major markets. In any event, there does not appear to be anything necessarily inconsistent in the Tribunal's adopting a marketplace standard and protection of the cable
industry from undue economic impact; a marketplace rate based upon transactions in
analogous marketplaces in fact subsumes considerations of impact since it reflects actual operating conditions. Cf. Amusement & Music Operators Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 676 F.2d 1144, 1157 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 210 (1982)
(marketplace analogy appropriate in setting jukebox royalty rates even where the Tribunal is directed by statute to consider the economic impact on jukebox operators).
Even if there were any inconsistency, Congress did not direct the Tribunal to place
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assessment as to what constitutes a reasonable rate, and
choosing a marketplace standard is not inconsistent with this
intent. The further question, of course, is whether as a matter
of policy the Tribunal should have raised the rates to what it,
on the basis of the record before it, considered to be marketplace levels.
In assessing the wisdom of the Tribunal's decision, it is important to consider the dramatic changes that have taken place
in those industry conditions which originally were advanced as
justification for the statutory rates. As discussed below, these
changes have undercut whatever rationale existed in the early
and mid-1970s for gearing the statutory rates solely to cable's
asserted ability and willingness to pay. The present-day circumstances further suggest that the Tribunal's decision to
adopt a marketplace standard was a correct policy choice.
A. Increased Strength of the Cable Industry
When Congress debated the copyright legislation, there was
considerable pessimism as to the future viability of what was
then an embryonic cable industry. Congress accepted the arguments made by cable that the entire system of compulsory
licensing, including only modest royalty payments, was necessary to ensure the industry's development. As Congressman
Kastenmeier, who was the principal House sponsor of the 1976
Act, recently observed: "Had we not done so, most assuredly,
the growth of a major new industry may well have been
stopped dead in its tracks."'"
This rationale can no longer be advanced to support royalty
rates that are below marketplace levels. During the seven
years following enactment of the copyright revision legislation,
cable has matured into a substantial and financially sound industry. This is apparent from a number of objective indicia,
including the unprecedented growth in industry subscribers,92
revenues, 93 and stock values,' as well as in the values of indiany priority on impact over other considerations which the Tribunal might consider
relevant.
91. 1982 Joint Hearings, supra note 13, at 53.
92. The number of basic cable subscribers has grown from about 12 million at the
beginning of 1976 to over 28 million as of February 1983. Cable Stats, Pay/BasicCable
Growth, CABLEVISION, April 18, 1983, 145. Currently, 34 percent of all television house-

holds subscribe to basic cable; by 1990, 61 percent are expected to subscribe. This compares to a 17 percent figure in 1976. Id.
93. The total operating revenues of the cable industry increased from less than $1
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vidual systems 95 and the availability of capital to finance expansion (a major concern during the copyright debates).6
Equally important has been the increased domination of the
industry by a relatively few corporations,9 7 many of which are
billion in 1976 to over $3.5 billion in 1981, and to nearly $5 billion (estimated) in 1982i.e., revenues have increased fivefold since the enactment of the statutory royalty
rates. The 1982 estimate is from Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Cable Industry Viewpoint, Table 7, October 1982, 18 [hereinafter cited as "Donaldson, Lufkin, Cable Industry Viewpoint"]. The 1981 figure is from FCC Annual Financial Report on the Cable
Television Industry, Table II, March 28, 1983 [hereinafter cited as "FCC Annual Financial Report"]. The 1976 figure is from FCC News Release on the Cable Television Industry, June 21, 1978. The growth in cable revenues is not explained simply by
inflation. During the period 1976-1982, the CPI rose by 69 percent from 170.5 to 288.6.
94. The growth in the value of cable television stocks versus the performance of
the stock market as a whole is illustrated in a cable stock index which is compiled by
Paul Kagan Associates. The average price of a share in the cable index rose from approximately $6 at the start of 1976 to a record high of $111 in November 1982. Paul
Kagan Associates, Inc., The Cable TV FinancialDatabook 76 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as "Paul Kagan Associates, Cable Databook"]. During this same seven-year period,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose a mere 22 percent.
95. In the 1970s, cable systems typically sold for about $300 per subscriber. U.S.
Department of Commerce, U.S. IndustrialOutlook 1982 at 369. Currently, the cost, on
average, is between $600 and $1,000 per subscriber. U.S. Department of Commerce,
U.S. IndustrialOutlook 1983 at 45-5. For examples of the prices paid for cable systems
during 1982, see Paul Kagan Associates, Cable Databook, supra note 94, at 124-28.
96. During the 1975 copyright hearings, a representative of the investment firm of
Warburg Paribas Becker presented a study which concluded that the cable industry
would be unable to attract the debt funds which it needed in order to expand. 1975
House Hearings, supra note 56, at 598. But as Michael Botein of the Communications
Media Center at New York Law School stated in his 1981 testimony before a congressional subcommittee: "As the cable television industry has proven its financial stability, regional as well as local banks, insurance companies, and other investors have
shown a willingness--and at times even a fervor-to make long-term debt commitments to any company with an apparently profitable franchise in hand." Cable Television Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority
Enterpriseand General Small Business Problems of the House Comm. on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 189 (1982). More recently, a BROADCASTING report on the
cable industry observed:
Cable continues to be a favorite in the financial markets. The money men perceive the industry as a dynamic, fast-growing business that stands out among
many others that have been knocked on their heels by the recession. Some of
the major cable operators can boast of being among the elite ranks of the below-prime borrowers.
State of the Industry: 1982, The Cable Connection, BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 37.
The assessments of Professor Botein and BROADCASTING are supported by a
Warburg Paribas study released in 1982. This study shows that debt funds supplied to
the cable industry have increased from barely over $1 billion in 1975 and 1976 to $3.7
billion in 1981 and nearly $5 billion (estimated) in 1982. Warburg Paribas Becker, Survey of Historicaland Projected Debt Fundsfor the Cable TV Industry 2 (1982). David
Wicks, Jr., managing director of Warburg Paribas, recently concluded that adequate
debt funds will be available to the cable industry throughout 1983. Wicks, Cable Finance: Signals Mixed for 1983, CABLE TV LAW & FINANCE, March 1983, 1, 6.
97. In 1983, approximately 63 percent of cable subscribers were served by the 25
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among the largest and most successful conglomerates in the
country. 98
This is not to say that the cable industry has become impervious to economic difficulties. Certainly, the costs of constructing and operating cable systems (particularly in urban areas),
as well as the competition posed by the new communications
media, can be significant; in the near future these factors likely
will keep industry profits below the record levels achieved during the first few years following passage of the 1976 Copyright
largest multiple system operators (MSOs). The top ten MSOs alone provided service
to approximately 46 percent of subscribers. See Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, May 16,
1983, 78-79. The domination of the industry by the large MSOs is a result of horizontal
mergers and acquisitions and the relative success of existing MSOs in the franchise
bidding for major markets. See Majority Staff of the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Telecommunications in Transition: The Status of Competitionin the TelecommunicationsIndustry 291
(Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as "1981 Majority Report"].
The trend toward horizontal and vertical integration and the merger of cable system
operators with still larger firms have greatly strengthened the cable industry in the
years since 1976. The increased strength stems from better access to internal and external capital. Larger companies are better able to absorb the large cash outlays that
are associated with constructing a new system and are able to balance it with the large
cash flows that are associated with more mature systems. Finally, the greater
creditworthiness of the larger company is apt to be an advantage in bidding for very
large systems. These advantages are discussed in Warburg Paribas Becker, Five-Year
Performance Survey of the Cable TV Industry 11 (December 1981) [hereinafter cited as
"Warburg Paribas, Five-Year Performance Survey"].
98. For example, six of the ten largest MSOs are owned by seven companies that
rank among the largest in the country in terms of total profit and other measures of
financial strength, as reported in the "Forbes 500." See Summary, FoRBES, May 9, 1983,
266-305. The seven are TeleCommunications, Inc. (TCI), Time, Inc. (ATC), Westinghouse (Group W), Cox Communications (Cox), American Express and Warner Communications (Warner Amex), and Times Mirror (Times Mirror).
Moreover, there has been a substantial improvement in the financial condition of the
large MSOs in the years following Congress' consideration of the Copyright Act. During the 1975 copyright hearings, the NCTA (through the investment firm of Warburg
Paribas Becker) presented a variety of financial data concerning nine of the largest
publicly traded MSOs. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 56, at 610. The NCTA
explained that this data provided a good indication of the health of the industry as a
whole. Id. at 599-600. During the Tribunal's 1982 rate-adjustment proceedings, the
NCTA again presented a Warburg Paribas analysis of the cable industry, including
financial data for eighteen of the largest MSOs. Warburg Paribas, Five-Year Performance Survey, supra note 97, Appendix A. A comparison of the data submitted by the
NCTA demonstrates that revenue, net income, shareholder's equity, return on equity,
and return on revenue rose significantly for the MSOs in the years between 1974 and
1980. For example, revenue per MSO rose, on average, from $29.5 to $62.1 million, and
whereas each MSO, on average, lost $1.8 million in 1974, it made a profit of $5.3 million
in 1980. Particularly significant, in view of the concerns raised in 1975 about the cable
industry being fully leveraged, is the fact that the ratio of long-term debt to dollar of
revenue has dropped, on average, from 1.95 in 1974 to 1.16 in 1980.
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Act.9" The point, however, is that the cable industry has come
a remarkably long way since 1976; it bears little resemblance to
the struggling industry which approached Congress during the
early to mid-1970s. Also, the industry today is much more optimistic about its future than in the earlier years. 10 0 These factors belie the need for the below-market rates afforded an
infant industry over seven years ago.
B.

Cable Penetration of the Major Markets

Another factor thought to justify modest royalty payments
was the desire to encourage cable's expansion into the major
urban markets. The cable industry argued that anything other
than minimal royalties would impede, if not prevent alto99. After years of steady growth, pre-tax net income declined from a record high of
$199 million in 1979 to $168 million in 1980 and $40 million in 1981. FCC Annual Financial Report, supra note 93, Table II. Industry analysts attribute the more modest "bottom line" to increased construction expenditures and high interest rates-both
expenses stemming from cable's heavy financial commitment to expanding into the
large urban areas. For example, an analyst with Drexel, Burnham & Lambert commented in the April 11, 1983 issue of CABLEVISION:
The magnitude of the decline (in pre-tax net income) does seem rather large,
but it makes sense.... The pre-tax line reflects what happens when you try
to translate operating income into earnings when you're in a rapid building
phase; you've got a lot of interest and a lot of depreciation. And it made for a
large decline.
Leading the Week, Revenues, Assets Climb, CABLEVISION, April 11, 1983, 20. In that
same article, an LF. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin analyst explained that the pre-tax
net income decline
because we're looking at an industry that
shouldn't raise many eyebrows,.
is hardly mature, despite the rapid growth that it's seen over the past years.
It's still in a phase where it is really growing; it's not even close to reaching its
full profit potential yet.
Id.
The general recessionary environment during 1981-1982 also contributed to the slackening in industry profits, although cable fared rather well in the recession compared to
most other service industries. See Special Report '82, CABLEVISION, December 27, 1982,
28; Wicks, Cable Finance: Signals Mixed for 1983, CABLE T.V. LAw & FINANCE, March
1983, 6.
100. Analysts generally agree that the long-term outlook for profitability in the
cable industry is bright. As one cable operator and broker (William Daniels) has said:
"They're going through a period now where they choke each month when they see
their losses. But in 10 years' time, they will be thrilled with what they have." Wall St.
J., Apr. 1, 1983, at 6. Indeed, one leading analyst predicts that cable profits will begin to
soar as early as 1984, when the pace of costly new construction will begin to ebb. Business, Liebowitz Bullish On Cable, BROADCASTING, January 10, 1983, 76 (quoting Dennis
Liebowitz, media analyst at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette). Liebowitz's favorable assessment of cable's prospects is detailed in Donaldson, Lufkin, Cable Industry Viewpoint, supra note 93. See also Wall St. J., May 20, 1983, at 57 (reporting that various
analysts predict "a turnaround in [cable] industry profitability").
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gether, the penetration of these areas-a result which Congress sought to avoid.
Since 1976, the cable industry has demonstrated a significant
commitment to wiring the major markets. As of mid-1982,
some 32 percent of the households in the top 50 markets subscribed to cable; the comparable figure was only 10 percent in
late 1974.101 Even these figures, however, do not provide a complete indication of the extent to which cable is moving into the
urban markets. A number of major market franchises have
been awarded only in the last two years; thus, cable has not yet
reached its full potential in these areas. 1°2 The intensity of
cable's interest in the major markets goes beyond such statistics, and is reflected in the rather extraordinary promises that
10 3
have been made in order to secure urban franchises.
One illustration of the changed circumstances with regard to
major market cable can be seen in New York City. During the
1975 House Hearings, the NCTA highlighted the fact that the
Manhattan cable franchisees were losing substantial sums of
money, even without making any copyright payments; 0 4 this
big city experience, the NCTA suggested, cautioned other
cable operators against seeking to penetrate the major mar101. The 1982 figure is derived from A.C. Nielsen data, as reported in Broadcasting!
Cablecasting Yearbook 1983 at D-287 to D-288. The 1974 figure is from Arbitron, as reported in the TV Factbook No. 47, 1978 Edition, at 98a-101a, which was current at the
time the Copyright Act was passed. (It should be noted that Nielsen estimates of cable
penetration tend to be slightly higher than those of Arbitron.) During the Tribunal's
rate adjustment proceedings, an NCTA witness projected that cable penetration in the
major markets will reach between 40 and 60 percent. Transcript in CRT Docket No. 812 at 1810 (testimony of James F. Ackerman).
102. For example, franchises were awarded during 1981-1982 in such major markets
as New York City (outlying boroughs), Chicago, Baltimore, Milwaukee, Boston, Denver, Montgomery County (Maryland), Sacramento, Minneapolis, Fort Worth, Miami,
and Tucson. See Donaldson, Lufkin, Cable Industry Viewpoint, supra note 93, at 24;
Warburg Paribas, Five-Year PerformanceSurvey, supra note 97, at 15.
103. Subsequent to passage of the Copyright Act, competing companies typically
gave away a substantial amount of equity to prominent people in the franchise city.
Winning bids frequently include reduced or even free rates for basic service, as well as
systems using costly dual cables with two-way, interactive capabilities and a capacity
of 100 or more channels. They also include various provisions for the support of local
origination programming and public access channels. An extreme example of the
promises that cable operators have made in order to secure the urban franchises can
be seen in the recent bidding for Boston. There, Cablevision's successful bid included
a $2 per month basic service of up to 52 channels and a commitment to pay 5 percent of
revenues to finance local access programming (in addition to a 3 percent franchise fee
payable to the city). Donaldson, Luflkin, Cable Industry Viewpoint, supra note 93, at
26.
104. 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 406-07, 640.
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kets. In 1981, however, no fewer than fourteen cable companies-including a number of major MSOs-submitted bids for
the right to franchise all or portions of the remaining boroughs
of New York City. 0 5 Moreover, the applicants for these new
franchises projected substantial profits for the systems they
proposed to build. 10 6
The fervor that cable exhibited during the late 1970s and
early 1980s to wire the large urban areas has cooled during the
past year or so. 10 7 Nevertheless, the situation with respect to
major markets is vastly different today than it was while copyright legislation was being debated. Some large cities, which
have delayed the cable franchising process or have made unrealistic demands, may find themselves bypassed by cable.
But the majority of the major markets have experienced
growth in cable penetration which many never believed possible a decade ago. Cable need not be afforded below-marketplace rates for distant signal programming to ensure that this
growth continues. Indeed, it would appear that, of the many
determinants of the extent to which the urban markets are
wired, the royalty rates for distant signals will not be a significant factor. 10 8
105. Indeed, both ATC and Teleprompter, which operated the two Manhatten systems which the NCTA claimed would be financially pressed by the imposition of copyright fees, applied for new franchises in the outlying boroughs. Although
Teleprompter ultimately withdrew its bid, ATC was awarded a part of the borough of
Queens.
106. For example, ATC estimated in its 1981 submission to the City that the system
it proposed for the borough of Queens would begin to show a profit within five years
and generate approximately $75 million in net income (after taxes) over the first ten
years of operation.
107. Recently, a few of the largest MSOs have withdrawn or pulled back from bidding for new franchises in the major urban areas; in some cities, all but two or three
companies have dropped out of the bidding. Donaldson, Lufkin, Cable Industry Viewpoint, supra note 93, at 25-26; Cooney, Cable TV's Costly Trip to the Big Cities, FORTUNE, April 18, 1983, 82, 87; Landro, Changing Channels, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1983, at 1, col.
6. In other cases, the victorious bidder has sought the approval of the franchising authority to scale down the system it initially proposed to build. See Business, Suffolk
FranchiseRevoked, CABLEVISION, April 4, 1983, 99 (Suffolk, Virginia); Special Report
'82, CABLEVISION, December 27, 1982, 35 (Denver). As a result, cities have begun to

show greater flexibility in their negotiations with cable operators. See Landro, Changing Channels, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
108. This point was made by an NCTA witness during the Tribunal's rate adjustment hearings. See Transcript in CRT Docket No. 81-2 at 1825-26 (testimony of James
F. Ackerman).
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Deregulation of the Cable Industry

During the hearings on copyright revision legislation the
cable industry emphasized the substantial costs which heavy
FCC regulation imposed upon it. Indeed, Dr. Mitchell, whose
study of the cable industry played a major role in the reduction
of the royalty rates, 109 testified: "It is primarily these regulatory policies which will limit development of cable service in
suburban and fringe areas and result in little or no central city
construction."' 10 Congress itself underscored the direct relationship between the compulsory licensing scheme and FCC
regulation, concluding: "[Al ny statutory scheme that imposes
copyright liability on cable television systems must take account of the intricate and complicated rules and regulations
adopted by the Federal Communications Commission to govern the cable television industry." ''
Since 1976 the FCC regulatory pendulum has swung almost
completely in the other direction. The FCC and the courts
have eliminated virtually all of those regulations which formed
the basis of cable's complaints during the copyright debates." 2
109. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
110. 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 403.
111. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra note 83, at 89.
112. Since 1976, the FCC has deleted its "leapfrogging" rules, which generally prevent cable systems from importing independent television signals from any but the
two closest television markets, Report and Order in Docket No. 20487, 57 F.C.C.2d 625,
para. 2 (1975) (effective 1976); exempted cable systems with less than 1,000 subscribers
from essentially all regulation, Second Report and Order in Docket No. 20561, 68
F.C.C.2d 18 (1978); eliminated the time-consuming and burdensome process by which
it required cable operators to apply for a certificate of compliance before commencing
operations in a particular community, Report and Order in CT Docket No. 78-206, 69
F.C.C.2d 697 (1978); expanded the categories of television signals which cable systems
need not delete under the network nonduplication rules, Memorandum Opinion and
Order in Docket No. 19995, 67 F.C.C.2d 1303, para. 11 (1978), aff'd sub nom. Spartan
Radiocasting Co. v. FCC, 619 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1980); eliminated all of its rules which
placed restrictions on the local franchising process, Report and Order in Docket No.
21002, 66 F.C.C.2d 380 (1977); eliminated virtually all restrictions on the licensing of
earth stations, which are used by cable systems to receive programming, First Report
and Order in CC Docket No. 78-374, 74 F.C.C.2d 205, para. 2 (1979); changed its rules to
permit the use of less costly small diameter earth stations, American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 901 (1976); and, prior to eliminating its restrictions on the
number of distant signals which may be imported, significantly relaxed the standards
for granting waivers of the rule, Arlington Telecommunications Corp., 69 F.C.C.2d 1923
(1978).
Additionally, since 1976, the courts required the FCC to delete its rules which had
restricted the amount of sports and movies available to pay cable and the amount of
advertising which could be placed on pay cable. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d
9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). The courts also required the FCC to
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The most significant of the Commission's actions, of course,
has been the repeal of the rules which led to the Tribunal's
rate adjustment. As Representative Kastenmeier has observed: "We did not contemplate such a sweeping change in
the regulatory structure when we drafted [the Copyright Revision Act of 1976] ."11 In short, the FCC regulatory factor can no
longer be advanced as a basis for below-market compulsory licensing rates.
To be sure, the federal deregulatory trend has not been paralleled at the state and local levels, where cable systems typically have been subjected to rate regulation and requirements
to provide various access and other community services. It is
questionable whether this regulation is more the product of industry competition than the demands of franchising authorities;11 4 it also is questionable whether and to what extent this
regulation will survive cable's current lobbying efforts before
Congress.' 15 Most importantly, though, the state and local regulation, unlike much of the former FCC regulation, is not
delete its rules which had required cable systems to afford the public access to their
facilities, to upgrade their channel capacity, and to provide for two-way capability.
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
113. Letter from Rep. Kastenmeier to FCC Chairman Ferris (March 13, 1980),
quoted in 79 F.C.C.2d at 897. See also Copyright Issues: Cable Television and Performance Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin.
of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1978) (statement of
Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights) (the cable provisions of the Copyright Act
acknowledged "the need for flexibility in FCC regulation of cable, but they did not
anticipate that the Commission would eliminate entirely either the distant signal or
the syndicated exclusivity rules. Piecemeal revision of the regulations, rather than
outright repeal, was clearly what Congress had in mind.").
114. The cable industry has become concerned that the terms of local franchises
may raise the cost of new systems to onerous levels. But the problem often stems
from unrealistic, '"pie-in-the-sky" promises made by cable operators in their zeal to
win franchises by lucrative markets. As Howard Gan, former general counsel to the
Cable Television Information Center, recently observed: '"The reality was that the cities never demanded much at all. It was truly the franchising staffs of the companies
that took the franchising process out of hand and out of sight." Government & Law,
CABLEVISION, April 4, 1983, 121. Moreover, it appears that market forces are working to
ensure that the cost of franchise inducements remains affordable to the cable industry.
See supra note 107.
115. Cable's efforts have resulted in a bill in the 98th Congress (S.66) which would,
among other things, deregulate basic subscriber rates in any market served by at least
four commercial television stations, place a 5 percent ceiling on local franchise fees,
and require local governments to grant franchise renewals unless the franchisee fails
to satisfy certain federal standards. It also would establish exclusive federal jurisdiction over cable except for matters of "strictly local concern." The bill recently was
passed by the Senate. Representatives of many of the largest cities and the telephone
industry vigorously oppose the bill in its present form. See Leading the Week, Battle
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designed to protect copyright owners. Thus, it cannot be a fair
basis for depriving copyright owners of royalties below those
that would be obtained in a free marketplace setting.
D. Availability of Alternative Programming Sources
Prior to passage of the Copyright Act, Congress' concern in
ensuring cable's access to distant signals was understandable.
Other than improved reception, distant signals were about all
that cable could offer in order to attract subscribers. Congress
recognized that, unless the compulsory licensing rates were
easily affordable to cable, a major component of the industry's
attractiveness would be lost. Once again, the situation today is
quite different.
The cable industry now has available to it a substantial
number of programming sources which did not exist when
copyright legislation was being considered. The most important new sources of programming are the "pay" serviceslargely first run, uninterrupted movies and other entertainment programming for which subscribers pay an additional
monthly fee on a per-channel basis. In 1976, there was only one
such service (Home Box Office), and it had just gotten underway. Today, there are 10 pay cable services available nationally by satellite and others in the offing;" 6 additionally, there
are 18 regional pay cable services that offer highly attractive
programming such as local professional sports events."7 The
Heating Up Over S.66, CABLEVISION, May 23, 1983, 15; Leading the Week, Cable Bill

Advances

CABLEVISION,

May 2, 1983, 15.

Even under current law, the scope of local regulation is restricted significantly by
federal preemption. For example, the FCC and the courts have held that local governments are preempted from regulating pay cable subscriber rates, Brookhaven Cable
TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979); local or
distant signal carriage, Clarification of the Cable Television Rules and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, para. 8 (1974); and technical standards,
Report and Order in Docket No. 20018, 49 F.C.C.2d 470 (1974). The FCC, at one time,
also had prevented states and municipalities from imposing access, channel capacity,
local origination, or interactive capability requirements more stringent than those set
forth in the FCC rules. See Report and Order in Docket No. 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 329
(1976) (adopting former 47 C.F.R. § 76.258). The cable industry, however, successfully
challenged the FCC rules imposing these requirements on cable systems, see FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979), thereby paving the way for unrestrained action by state and local authorities.
116. Cable Stats, Cable Services Subscriber Counts, CABLEVISION, April 25, 1983, 98.
More than 35 new satellite services (including pay cable and advertiser-supported
services) have been announced and expect to become operational in the near future.
Id.
117. Id.
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various pay services, which have provided the cable industry
with a very significant source of revenue, 1 8 have been the principal factor underlying cable's dramatic growth during the
years subsequent to 1976.
The other new sources of programming include advertisersupported origination networks (offering sports, news, public
affairs, and various forms of entertainment programming);
noncommercial public affairs and cultural networks; and religious networks. These programming services, some 30 of
which are now available via satellite, 119 are important to cable
in a number of respects. First, they increase the overall attractiveness of cable television generally, and add to the diversity
which has aided the penetration of major markets. Second,
cable systems are permitted to sell local advertising in many of
these services, thereby affording an additional source of revenue; in 1982, these revenues amounted to approximately 35 million dollars.120 Third, many of the programming services
compensate their affiliated cable systems, thereby providing
yet another source of revenue which did not exist in 1976. Finally, they permit added revenue from "tiering," a concept
which was unheard of in 1976.121
The development of the cable networks has been attributed
to a number of factors. 2 2 Whatever the explanation, though,
118. Pay cable revenues were estimated to be nearly $2 billion in 1982, an increase
of 29 times the pay revenues in 1976. Paul Kagan Associates, Cable Databook,supra
note 94, at 32. While pay cable revenues accounted for only 4 percent of the cable
industry's total revenues in 1976, today they account for about 40 percent. It is indeed
significant that when Dr. Bridger Mitchell submitted his study on cable's future during
the Congressional hearings on the copyright revision legislation, he specifically declined to take account of any possible revenues from pay cable services. See supra
text accompanying notes 42-43; 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 29, at 402.
119. Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, April 25, 1983, 98.
120. Special Report '82, Advertising, CABLEVISION, Dec. 27, 1982, 41. One industry
analyst forecasts that this source of revenue will grow at an average annual rate of 54
percent through the end of the decade. Paul Kagan Associates, Cable Databook,supra
note 94, at 33.
121. In tiering, a cable operator typically charges incremental amounts for additional groups of channels. The first group or tier might consist of local, over-the-air
signals; the second tier might consist of advertiser-supported cable services, including
superstations; a third tier might be composed entirely of one or more pay cable services. Thus, the advertising-supported origination networks can provide an attractive
tier of programming for which the cable operator can directly derive added revenues.
122. The growth of cable programming networks was fostered by regulatory and
technological developments which took place subsequent to the passage of the Copyright Act. In 1977, a federal court invalidated the FCC's restrictions on the types of
programming available to pay cable. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). In December of 1976, the FCC issued a ruling
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cable now has an impressive array of programming to offer in
lieu of additional distant signals. Thus, in setting the compulsory licensing rates, one need not be as concerned about ensuring cable's access to distant signals as Congress was in
1976.123

E. Erosion of Protection for Copyright Owners
Economic, technological and regulatory barriers severely
limited the ability of cable to retransmit television signals from
distant markets in 1976.124 This, in turn, gave Congress some
assurance that cable would be unable to utilize the copyright
owners' works to any substantial degree; therefore, copyright
owners would not suffer any substantial harm from cable's exploitation of copyrighted works at below-market rates.
As a result of satellite technology, the cable industry now
has a much greater capacity and flexibility to import large
amounts of programming over long distances and at very low
cost relative to the value of the programming.1 25 Furthermore,
which significantly reduced the minimum antenna size required for receiver-only
earth stations. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 901 (1976). Later,
in October of 1979, the FCC eliminated mandatory licensing of receive-only earth stations and greatly reduced the regulatory burdens associated with voluntary licensing.
First Report and Order in CC Docket No. 78-374, 74 F.C.C.2d 205 (1979).
As a result of these actions and various technological developments, the cost of receiving satellite-delivered cable programming has dropped dramatically. For example,
the initial costs of securing an acceptable earth station have gone from around $150,000
in 1976 to about $3,000 today. Shooshan &Jackson, Inc., Cable Copyright and Consumer
Welfare: The Hidden Cost of the Compulsory License 30 (1981).
123. The increasing importance of made-for-cable programming and the correspondingly decreasing importance of distant signals recently was noted by the FCC,
which observed that the cable industry has changed "from one which, from its inception, predominantly relied on broadcast signal retransmission for its existence, to one
which is increasingly turning to nonbroadcast program and information sources and
services." Proposed Rule in MM Docket No. 83-331, 48 Fed. Reg. 26,472, 26,478 (June 8,
1983).
124. At the time that Congress established the statutory royalty rates, sheer economics limited the number of signals and the distances over which they could be carried. Most cable systems had the capacity to carry programming on no more than 12 to
20 channels. Moreover, the distant signals had to be received either off-the-air or via
terrestrial microwave; it was prohibitively expensive to import signals over great distances. Copyright owners received further protection from pervasive FCC regulations
which restricted the number of signals that a cable system could import and limited a
cable system's ability to "leapfrog" nearby television stations in order to carry more
distant (and more desirable) stations. These FCC regulations were particularly important in the large urban markets where all program suppliers derive the bulk of their
revenues from the sale of program rights and where the sports interests derive their
attendance revenues.
125. In addition to providing cable with cable origination programming, satellites
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cable has (particularly in major population centers) a greatly
increased amount of channel capacity to deliver that programming to its subscribers. 2 6 And, as noted above, there no longer
are any FCC regulations restricting the number of distant signals that cable systems may import. In short, gone are the
technological and regulatory barriers which prevented the pervasive utilization of copyrighted distant signal programming.
There are, of course, the traditional questions as to whether
and to what extent copyright owners are damaged by cable's
retransmission of this programming. But trying to prove that
there is harm is as elusive and problematic as trying to prove
that there is no harm. To be sure, there has been no conclusive
showing either way, although there is little doubt that copyright owners are sufficiently convinced of the harm that they
often are willing to make substantial business judgments
based upon this conviction. In any event, the relevant consideration here is that Congress in 1976 tipped the scale in favor of
cable in part because the regulatory and technological situation appeared to offer substantial protection to copyright owners' interests. The absence of this protection means that
another justification for below-market rates has disappeared.
F.

The Development of Alternative Media

Congress in 1976 had to be concerned about cable's growth
since cable was perceived as the only available means to increase program diversity for the American public. During the
have made possible the growth of three so-called "superstations"-major market independent television stations whose signals are picked up by a satellite resale carrier
and distributed nationally to cable systems. There are presently three such superstations-WGN, WOR, and WTBS-which reach 11.1, 4.7, and 25.8 million cable subscribers, respectively. Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, May 23, 1983, 104. These superstations
broadcast a large amount of highly attractive movies and sports, as well as other popular programs. For example, a cable system that carries all three superstations annually brings into its market over 560 distant signal telecasts of professional sports teams.
See Cable Copyright Legislation: Hearingson H.R. 5949 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1982) (statement of Bowie K. Kuhn).
126. In 1976, at most, only 22 percent of all cable systems had a capacity of 20 or
more channels. See TV Factbook No. 46, 1977 Edition, at 73a. In 1981, over 35 percent
had such capacity. See TVFactbook No. 50, 1981-82 Edition, at 83a. Systems now being
proposed or built in major population centers have enormous capacity; 35, 50, and even
100 channel systems are the norm. Proposed Rule in MM Docket No. 83-331, supra,
note 123, at 26,478. Most recently, the franchisee of Pasadena, California, promised to
construct a 142-channel system. Leading the Week, Falcon 500 Wins Pasadena,
CABLEVISION, May 30, 1983, 19.

COMM/ENT

L. J.

[Vol. 5

past seven years there has been a proliferation of new or improved technologies that are already or soon will be providing
additional video programming to the public, including the Mul-

tipoint Distribution Service, 127 low power television, 128 subscription television,

29

direct broadcast satellites,

30

satellite

127. Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) uses microwave frequencies to deliver
pay TV programming to hotels, motels, apartment buildings, and, as a result of rapid
decreases in antenna and downconverter costs, to individual residences as well. By
the end of 1976, MDS was used to provide pay TV service to 8 markets; by the end of
1982, the comparable figure had increased to 99. Paul Kagan Associates, Inc., Multicast, March 4, 1983. See generally, Donaldson, Lufkin, Cable Industry Viewpoint,
supra note 93, at 58-61. The FCC recently has authorized "multi-channel MDS"-that
is, an MDS operator in any one market may utilize up to five channels (a total of 10
channels will be available in each market). FCC News Release No. 4428, Gen. Docket
No. 80-112 (May 27, 1983). Federal Communications Commission staff estimate that up
to 7,000 applications may be filed as a result of this action.
128. Low power television broadcast stations (LPTV) can operate as "miniature"
broadcast stations which receive financial support by selling advertising time, by operating in a subscription mode (i.e., with a scrambled signal), or through local taxes. In
addition to retransmitting regular television stations, low power stations can utilize
satellite-delivered programming such as that which is carried by cable. The FCC approved the final rules for the new service in 1982; it estimated that as many as 4,000 new
LPTV stations will be created. Report and Order in BC Docket No. 78-253, 47 Fed. Reg.
21,468 (1982), as corrected, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,495 (1982); see Top of the Week, LPTV Gets
the FCC Go-Ahead, BROADCASTING, March 8,1982, 35. As of April 1983, the Commission
had received more than 12,000 applications for LPTV service and had licensed 169
LPTV stations and issued 161 construction permits. Where Things Stand, BROADCASTING, April 4, 1983, 27, 141. The FCC recently authorized the use of lotteries to expedite
the awarding of initial LPTV authorizations. Report and Order in Gen. Docket No. 81768, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 1401, para. 1 (1983).
129. Subscription television (STV) refers to the transmission of scrambled programming-principally movies, sports and other entertainment fare-from full-power
television stations to subscribers equipped with decoders who pay a monthly fee. The
concept of over-the-air subscription television has been around for quite some time,
but recent advances in integrated circuit technology and other developments have
finally made it feasible. Consequently, although there were no STV subscribers prior
to 1977, there are currently about 2.2 million subscribers. See Paul Kagan Associates,
The Kagan Census of Cable and Pay TV, September 30, 1982; Paul Kagan Associates,
Cable Databook, supra note 94, at 7. The future of STV is brighter now than it was in
1976, principally because the FCC has removed many of its regulations which had limited severely the number of STV stations, their hours of operation, and the types of
programming they could carry. Report and Order in Docket No. 21489, 43 Fed. Reg.
15,322 (1978); First Report and Order in Docket No. 21502, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (1979);
Third Report and Order in Docket No. 21502, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982).
130. Direct Broadcast Satellites (DBS) would transmit programming from high
power geostationary satellites directly to individual homes where the signals would be
received on inexpensive antennas/receivers. The FCC authorized DBS service on an
experimental basis in 1982. Report and Order in Gen. Docket No. 80-603, 90 F.C.C.2d
676 (1982), appeal pending. The FCC has already authorized eight applications to
launch high-powered satellites for DBS operation. CBS, Inc., 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F)
1112, para. 3 (1982). Satellite Television Corporation, a subsidiary of Comsat, recently
announced plans to provide a five-channel DBS-type service to the northeastern
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master antenna services 3 ' and videocassette recorders. 3 2
This trend will almost certainly accelerate because of further
technological developments and declining costs of electronic
equipment, and because the FCC likely will continue its proderegulation and pro-competition tendencies.
The development of other technologies and services for delivering video programming means that cable television is no
longer the only technology on the horizon that is capable of
providing such diversity. Consequently, there is less need to
adopt compulsory licensing rates which favor cable. Indeed,
because of its compulsory license, cable already enjoys a significant advantage over the emerging technologies; unlike
these technologies, cable need not bargain in the marketplace
for all of its programming. Allowing cable to retransmit programming at rates less than those which the copyright owners
can reasonably expect to charge the new media gives cable an
United States by the fall of 1984; it will use a lower powered satellite than will be used
by a true DBS service. BROADCASTING, May 23, 1983, 34.
131. Satellite Master Antenna Systems (SMATV) are, in effect, private cable systems that serve private apartment complexes and other multi-unit housing developments. Satellite-transmitted programming, such as that available to cable, is received
by an earth station that is located on private property and hooked into a master antenna system which connects to the individual housing units. With the earth station,
SMATV can provide as many channels as cable television; the typical system offers 15
to 20 channels. SMATV did not exist in 1976; today, it serves approximately 300,000
subscribers. Paul Kagan Associates, Cable Databook, supra note 94, at 7.
132. In 1976, there were only about 80,000 videocassette recorders (VCRs) in use,
but by 1980 the number had increased to 1.85 million. TV Factbook No. 50, 1981-82 Edition, at 79a. It has been estimated that there will be 10.6 million VCR and videodisc
users by 1985 and over 30 million VCR and videodisc users by 1990-or about one-third
of the estimated number of U.S. television households in that year. 1981 Majority Report, supra note 97, at 305. As of 1981, over 33,000 programs were available on prerecorded videocassettes and videodiscs. National Association of Broadcasters, New
Technologies Affecting Radio & Television Broadcasting 35 (1981).
The growing popularity of VCRs has spawned considerable controversy over the legality of "home taping"--the off-the-air videotaping of copyrighted television programs
by viewers. In the celebrated Betamax case, the Ninth Circuit held that home taping
constitutes copyright infringement. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982). The Ninth
Circuit's decision prompted Congress to consider legislation which would permit home
taping while requiring the manufacturers and importers of blank tape and recording
equipment to pay a royalty fee to copyright owners. Under the current version of the
royalty bill (S.31), the fees would be paid into the Copyright Office and distributed to
the copyright owners by the Tribunal, in a manner similar to cable's compulsory license. Unlike cable royalty fees, however, the home taping fees would be established
by voluntary negotiation among the parties (subject to binding arbitration if agreement is not reached). Senator Mathias explained that the purpose of the negotiation
provisions is to "place maximum reliance on the free market to establish fair royalty
fees." 129 Cong. Rec. S254 (daily ed. January 26, 1983).
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additional unfair advantage over these media, distorts investment decisions, and results in a less than optimal mix of distribution technologies.
The former head of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration of the Department of Commerce
recently observed:
If cable television were truly a small, struggling "cottage industry," and were the last best hope for affording the American
public more information options and greater news and entertainment choices, perhaps some sort of preferential copyright system would be defensible. Cable television today,
however, is but another-albeit major-player in our increasingly competitive and diversified video marketplace.
[W]e should not perpetuate and entrench a regulatory system
that accords133any one competitor in the marketplace a special
preference.
These remarks were made in support of a proposal to replace
compulsory licensing with a free marketplace. But they are
equally supportive of a proposal to ensure, at the very least,
that cable pay the same marketplace rates that the other media must pay.
G. Ensuring Program Diversity
When Congress established the compulsory licensing rates,
its overall concern was one of promoting the availability of diverse programming to its constituents. Compulsory licensing
combined with minimal royalty payments was thought to have
this effect. By the same token, the Tribunal's decision to raise
the rates has been challenged on the ground that it will limit
program diversity; the claim is that some number of cable systems will refuse to pay the higher rates, thereby depriving
their subscribers of access to the programming.
One can accept the basic premise that a decision to raise the
royalty rates to marketplace levels will result in fewer
purchases of the distant signal product-although there are no
firm data on the precise extent to which the Tribunal's rate adjustment has caused cable systems to drop or not to add distant signals."M It does not necessarily follow, however, that the
133. 1982 Joint Hearings, supra note 13, at 62 (statement of Bernard Wunder).
134. On the basis of a survey it conducted of 30 MSOs, the NCTA predicted that
more than 6 million cable subscribers would lose distant signals as a result of the Tri-
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viewing public is deprived of program diversity. For example,
cable systems that dropped distant signals in response to the
Tribunal's rate increase often added cable originated networks,
which they considered to be adequate substitutes for distant
signals. 135 More importantly, the long-term consequences of
requiring copyright owners to license their programming to
cable at below-market rates likely will reduce the amount of
programming available overall to the American public, for a
number of reasons.
First, as noted above, there are now a variety of new media
which compete with cable. None of the new media possesses a
compulsory license;'3 6 all must pay marketplace rates to program rights holders. To the extent that cable receives favored
treatment through below-market rates, the new media will be
put at a distinct competitive disadvantage. This, in turn, may
restrict the ability of the new media to expand and thereby to
provide the public with added program diversity.
Second, the below-market rates also disadvantage the cable
bunal's action. Leading the Week, More Snow For Subs, CABLEVISION, February 21,
1983, 15. This survey, however, was conducted prior to the effective date of the rate
increase. Current indications are that many cable operators that had intended to drop
distant signals subsequently changed their minds; in many cases, they simply passed
along the higher royalties directly to subscribers. See Leading the Week, Pass-along
Fees Provide Relief, CABLEVISION, May 2, 1983, 20; Newswire, CABLEVISION, May 23,
1983, 11. WTBS, for example, had predicted losing up to 1 million subscribers, but the
superstation was dropped by only 33 cable systems, representing a mere 320,000 of the
over 25 million subscribers who receive it. Multichannel News, Mar. 21, 1983, at 1, 31.
Moreover, the relationship between the rate increase and the dropping of distant signals is less clear than might be supposed. The NCTA's own witnesses at the Tribunal's
rate adjustment hearings testified that, even prior to the rate hike, cable operators
were in the process of dropping distant signals as they moved away from reliance on
distant signal programming. See Transcript in CRT Docket No. 81-2 at 1421-22 (testimony of Carolyn Chambers), 1505-07, 1517 (testimony of John Evans), 1682-83, 1700
(testimony of Marvin Lafferty). In addition, it appears that confusion over the scope of
the Tribunal's decision caused some cable operators to drop distant signals that were
not subject to the higher rates.
135. Instances in which cable operators have added cable origination networks to
replace the distant signals they dropped have been reported widely in the trade press.
See, e.g., Variety, Mar. 16, 1983, at 1; Multichannel News, Mar. 21, 1983, at 1, 31. During
the rate adjustment hearings, witnesses from the cable industry repeatedly testified
that the growth of the satellite-delivered, made-for-cable programming services has
reduced substantially cable's need for distant signals. See, e.g., Transcript in CRT
Docket No. 81-2 at 1503-04, 1508, 1515, 1625-27 (testimony of John Evans), 1785-86, 179192, 1825-26 (testimony of James F. Ackerman). Indeed, the FCC recently has noted
cable's decreasing dependence on distant signal programming. See supra note 123.
136. The one exception is satellite master antenna service (SMATV), see supra
note 131, which falls within the definition of a "cable system" in 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)
(1982) and therefore can utilize the cable compulsory license.

COMM/ENT

L. J.

[Vol. 5

origination networks, which compete with distant signals for
acceptance by cable operators and which must increase their
affiliates in order to increase advertising revenue. In light of
the relatively cheap availability of distant signal programming,
the cable networks have been forced to make a variety of concessions in order to become sufficiently attractive to cable-including the offering of direct payments to cable.1 3 7 Many of the
cable networks are now finding that such concessions threaten
their future viability. As long as cable can obtain distant signal
programming at below-market rates, the diversity provided by
cable origination networks is itself in jeopardy.
Third, in the long run, below-market rates will induce copyright owners to restrict the amount of their programming on
free television, or to withdraw it altogether. This not only will
impair the viability of conventional television. It also will result in a loss of viewing options to those members of the American public who depend upon over-the-air television-those
who either cannot afford or do not have access to cable.
The adverse impact that below-market rates ultimately will
have on the supply of programming to conventional television
is documented in at least two scholarly works138---one of which
137. One industry trade journal recently observed, with respect to the advertisersupported cable services:
Part of the basic cable services' problem is the cable operators they were
created to serve. With supply high and demand low (many systems that are
filled to the brim with programming), many cable operators are taking advantage of their market position to extract, as one partner put it, "the last ounce of
blood [from program suppliers] in the form of upfront payments, launch support assistance, co-op advertising dollars and forgiveness of subscriber fees."
Cable: Coming to Terms With Adulthood, BROADCASTING, January 3, 1983, 74.
138. See Shooshan & Jackson, Inc., Cable Copyright and Consumer Welfare: The
Hidden Cost of the Compulsory License (1981); Besen, Manning & Mitchell, Copyright
Liabilityfor Cable Televis-ion: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 67 (1978).
The Besen, Manning & Mitchell study was an economic analysis of the compulsory
license which was undertaken under the auspices of the Rand Corporation shortly after the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act. The authors stated their conclusion as
follows:
The objective of compulsory licensing is to limit negotiation costs, but unless
rates are set correctly and adjusted frequently they will create the wrong incentives to program suppliers. If, as we conjecture, the rates contained in the
revision will generate too little revenue, then as cable penetration and distantsignal importation increase, the ability of program suppliers to capture the incremental value of their programs will decline. Some suppliers may be forced
out of business and others may never enter the industry at all.
21 J.L. & ECON. at 95.
The Shooshan & Jackson study provides evidence that the compulsory license al-
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was co-authored by Dr. Mitchell who, as noted above, was instrumental in formulating the original statutory schedule.'39
Copyright owners expect to receive adequate compensation
from the television stations to which their works are licensed
as well as the cable systems which profit from the retransmission of the stations. 1" Unless the total payment received from
the stations and the systems is considered fair, copyright owners increasingly will look to other media as a source for the
distribution of their works.

IV
Conclusion
The United States has now moved into the Information Age.
Over 50 percent of our nation's labor effort currently is inready is having an adverse impact on the supply of programming to conventional television. The study cites a number of specific examples where programming has been or
may be denied to over-the-air television viewers because producers are unable to control the retransmission of television programming by cable systems. See Shooshan &
Jackson, Inc., supra, at 54-62.
Shooshan & Jackson conclude that, under the compulsory license, "as cable coverage
expands, millions of viewers without cable service will have even fewer choices than
they do today." Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). They note further that sports programming is particularly vulnerable to the market distortions caused by the compulsory
license.
The compulsory license for cable systems threatens to destroy the traditional
television distribution market for sports. In the short term, it denies consumers programs which are not made available to some broadcast stations in order
to prevent cable systems from distributing those programs in other markets.
In the long term, as full liability media increase their coverage, the compulsory
license could induce programmers to withhold sports events altogether from
broadcast stations (and thereby from traditional cable subscribers) in favor of
pay cable, STV, MDS and other full liability alternatives.
Id. at 55.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43. Indeed, during the rate adjustment
hearings, Dr. Mitchell testified that he now supports a marketplace approach to the
cable royalty rates. Dr. Mitchell explained that regulatory, economic, and technological changes in the cable industry warrant the payment of marketplace rates by cable
operators for their distant signal programming. Transcript in CRT Docket No. 81-2 at
397-421.
140. Both the Tribunal and the FCC have concluded that there is no evidence that
the copyright owners of television programming will receive additional payments from
television stations to compensate for the distant viewing of their programming on
cable. See 47 Fed. Reg. 52,146, 52,156 (1982) ("[O]ur record provides no basis for any
general finding that program suppliers are being compensated for the distant signal
audience"); Report and Order in Dockets No. 20988 & 21284, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 763 para.
229 (1980) ("[W]e cannot determine . . . whether this is a stable equilibrium [i.e.,
whether superstations will pay more for programming] because we do not know
whether these stations will receive additional revenue for distant cable viewing").
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volved in the collection, processing and dissemination of information.1 4 ' In other words, information activities have now
surpassed the production of industrial goods just as industrial
production once surpassed agricultural production as a percentage of our Gross National Product. Because of the increasingly dominant role of information in our society, it becomes
more important than ever that the originators of such information-the producers of programs and software-be compensated fully and fairly for their creativity.
It is in this larger context that the royalty rates in the 1976
Act should be examined. These rates reflected a balancing between objectives based on the conditions extant at that time.
The situation today, however, is entirely different. The policy
concerns that originally may have justified a royalty schedule
tied solely to cable's ability and willingness to pay are no
longer applicable. Moreover, there are now strong policy reasons supporting rates that approximate those which the copyright owners would reasonably charge in a free marketplace.
The Tribunal's determination to adopt rates which, in its
judgment, reflect such marketplace considerations is entirely
consistent with the broad discretion with which it was vested
by Congress in the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. Perhaps
even more important, the Tribunal's approach represents
sound policy. If the compulsory license is to be retained, Congress itself should be guided by the same approach in amending the statutory rates which apply to the vast majority of
distant signal programming retransmitted by cable and which
were unaffected by the Tribunal's decision.

141. J. Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives ch. 2
(1982).

